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IMPOSITION OF STRICT LIABILITY FOR CROP DUSTING
DAMAGE
Loe v. Lenkardt
72 Or. 1011, 362 P2d 312 (1961)
Defendant hired an independent contractor to spray his crops by air-
plane. Plaintiff, an adjoining landowner, alleged that the spray damaged his
land and crops. In an action for trespass, the trial court granted a judgment
of involuntary nonsuit for defendant and directed a verdict in favor of the
independent contractor. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed for a new
trial on the basis of strict liability. The court held that a landowner who
undertakes an extra-hazardous activity, knowing of the high probability of
harm involved, should be liable for the resulting damage if the activity mis-
carries. The element of fault in the landowner's conduct is the intentional
subjection of his neighbor to a high degree of risk.'
Courts generally find liability for damage resulting from crop dusting2
on the basis of negligence.3 The crop dusting cases holding negligence have
adopted two distinct theories.4 One theory followed holds the defendant
landowner liable only if he fails to exercise due care in applying the spray.
The other theory holds him liable if the plaintiff merely establishes the fact
that it was the defendant's act which caused the damage.6 Under the first
theory, the failure to cut off the spray when making a circle over a neighbor's
pasture,7 spreading poison close enough to a neighbor's fence so his cattle
could reach it,8 or not making proper allowance for weather conditions 9 were
held to be negligent acts. The second theory removes, for all practical pur-
poses, the element of fault as a basis for defendant's liability, thus tending
to apply the doctrine of strict liability under the guise of negligence.'0 It is
generally held that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent
1 Loe v. Lenhardt, 72 Or. 1011, 362 P.2d 312 (1961). The court apparently intended
"fault" to mean moral or social rather than legal fault in this instance.
2 The term "crop dusting" in this note is used to describe the application of spray
or powder by airplane.
3 Link v. Spezia, 95 Cal. App.2d 296, 213 P.2d 47 (1949); 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950).
4 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.I. 330 (1868), the
leading case returning to the doctrine of strict liability since negligence has become an
important element of tort law, has not been followed in the crop dusting cases.
5 Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 335 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960),
modified, 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
6 Adams v. Henning, 117 Cal. App. 2d 376, 255 P.2d 456 (1953).
7 Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846, 136 S.W.2d 484 (1940).
8 Underhill v. Motes, 158 Kan. 173, 146 P.2d 374 (1944).
9 Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952); Jones v. Morgan, 96 So.2d
109 (La. App. 1957); Miles v. A. Arena and Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260
(1937).
1o Adams v. Henning, supra note 6, at 378, 255 P.2d at 457; Heeb v. Prysock, 219
Ark. 899, 245 S.W.2d 577 (1952); S. A. Gerrard Inc. v. Fricker, 42 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d
678 (1933); Aerial Sprayers Inc. v. Yerger, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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contractor."- However, once the plaintiff establishes negligence by an inde-
pendent contractor, the majority of courts have made an exception to the
general rule and held the landowner liable.' 2
The only other reported case holding the landowner strictly liable for
crop dusting damage is Gotreaux v. Gary.13 In that case, the herbicide
sprayed by defendant drifted onto the fields of plaintiff and destroyed his
crops. In holding for plaintiff, the court said:
Although the use of the spraying operation was lawful it was car-
ried out in such a manner as to reasonably inconvenience plaintiff
and deprive him of the liberty of enjoying his farm.' 4
The court based its decision on the civil law theory that one cannot use his
property to the injury of any legal right of another. This theory is similar to
the early common law concept of strict liability.15 The court in the principal
case differentiated its reasoning from that of the Gotreaux decision and held
crop dusting to be an extra-hazardous activity.16 Liability is imposed only
when the risk of harm is greater than the utility of the sprayer's conduct 1'
and when the harm complained of is within the class of harm threatened by
the conduct.18 Crop dusting is a beneficial and often an essential practice in
11 Mechem, Agency § 1870 (2d ed. 1914).
12 Heeb v. Prysock, supra note 10, at 901, 245 S.W.2d at 579; McKennon v. Jones,
219 Ark. 671, 244 S.W.2d 138 (1951); S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, supra note 10, at
507, 27 P.2d at 680; Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953). Contra,
Pitchfork Land & Cattle -Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), the only
reported case not holding the landowner liable for negligence when the spraying was
done by an independent contractor.
13 Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957).
14 Supra note 13, at 378, 94 So. 2d at 294.
15 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts 785 (1956): "Liability at common law
for injury to person or damage to real or personal property is for the most part today
based upon some moral or social fault . . . there are good grounds to believe that the
very early concept of justice in common law was otherwise; that the law required any-
one who caused harm to his neighbor to make good the loss irrespective of any fault
or intent to harm on the part of the actor."
16 Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). It is
the function of the court to decide if an activity is extra-hazardous.
17 Gronn et ux. v. Rogers Constr. Inc., 221 Ore. 226, 233, 350 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1960);
Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law of Torts 185 (1953). A hypothetical case will
illustrate this point. A hires an aerial applicator to spray his rice field with 2,4-D, a
chemical that is commonly known to have a fatal effect on cotton. B is an adjoining
landowner growing cotton. Because of the propensity of a spray to drift, it is highly
probable that B's cotton crop will be damaged even if the applicator uses utmost care
in spraying.
18 Loe v. Lenhardt, supra note 1. Suppose that A is contemplating spraying his
rice field with 2,4-D. This chemical will not have harmful effect on any crops within
a four mile radius of A's land. B lives five miles from A and 2,4-D will have a deadiy
effect on B's cotton crop. Assume that when A decides to spray he cannot reasonably
anticipate that the chemical will drift beyond a one mile radius of his land. If A then
sprays and B's cotton crop is damaged, B cannot recover on the theory of strict liability.
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agricultural production and is not always an extra-hazardous activity.' 9 At
certain times and under the proper conditions, aerial spraying is a safe agri-
cultural 'practice. There is danger involved, however. Some chemicals used
in this activity are harmless to certain plants and animals, but are fatal to
others.2 0 The problem of drift, which often cannot be eliminated with the
use of utmost care, further increases the risk of harm in crop dusting.2'
When these elements of danger are present it is apparent that the risk of
harm can be greater than the utility of the sprayer's conduct.
The court reached a desirable result in the principal case by applying
the doctrine of strict liability rather than following existing precedent. The
spraying landowner should bear the loss when crop dusting is held to be an
extra-hazardous activity, even if he used utmost care. The spraying land-
owner may be free from fault under negligence law, but the question of fault
is not at issue. The question to be decided is which of the two legally inno-
cent parties should bear the loss. The injured neighbor is wholly innocent.
No act or omission to act by him has caused the damage. Therefore, it is
reasonable that the party who voluntarily caused the harm shall bear the
loss. The fact that the spraying landowner can minimize his loss by purchas-
ing insurance should not be overlooked. Thus his innocent neighbor can be
protected and the sprayer's loss can be spread among the other landowners
engaged in the same activity.22 The principal case coincides with Prosser's
view that "the hazardous enterprise, even though it be socially valuable, must
pay its way, and make good the damage inflicted.
'23
19 See note, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 531 (1959).
20 As an example, 2,4-D, a chemical commonly used by aerial applicators, does not
harm narrow-leafed plants such as corn and wheat, but has a deadly effect on broad-
leafed plants such as cabbage and tomatoes. See Burns v. Vaughn, 216 Ark. 128, 224
S.W.2d 365 (1949).
21 Ibid. Even though the applicator uses due care, the spray or dust may drift
a great distance, many miles in some cases, from the area sprayed.
22 Supra note 18.
23 Prosser, Torts 332 (2d ed. 1955).
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